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Abstract 
 
The impact of the different financial frameworks on the long-run growth is one of the most debated 
arguments in the economic theory. In this paper we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of 
the financial systems which characterize the financial interrelation in some European countries: the 
bank oriented model and the market oriented one. The first one was developed during the last part 
of the nineteenth century in the countries where the court system was based on the civil law 
principles, the other one became the financial model for the countries historically characterized by a 
regulatory framework with the common law approach.  Considering the financial accounts of some 
European countries (source:  EUROSTAT data, OECD data), we calculate the Goldsmith’s ratios 
and other indicators for the period 2000-2008. For each considered country as regard to the 
European Monetary Union, first of all we asses the financial interrelation and intermediation and 
then we analyze the debt and the net financial wealth of the private non financial sector and of the 
Households one. 
  
Keywords: financial framework, civil law, common law, bank and market oriented, financial 
accounts, Goldsmith’s ratios.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of the level of financial development on economic growth has been widely 
discussed in the recent literature. Without doubts long-run economic development is correlated to 
total factor productivity and to firm competitiveness, but other elements are crucial for the real 
growth like the access to direct and indirect funding by productive and consumption units. The 
financial system matters for the investment decisions taken by firms because asymmetric 
information causes both adverse selection and moral hazard problems, ultimately leading to market 
failures. The principal / agent conflicts may create opportunistic behaviours by the interested 
parties: in particular, if the control on the agent is not so strict, he could have the temptation to 
default on the underwritten contracts and so to create market imperfections by his action.  
Financial intermediaries, by allowing the operation of the payments system and promoting the 
matching between the funds providers and the funds takers, operate as “delegated monitors” 
(Diamond, 1984), because they gather and monitor information available in the long-run 
relationship kept up with the firms. In this way they reduce the inefficiencies associated with 
asymmetric information and they are able to asses in a right way the risk profile of each costumer 
by learning-by doing process. Banks, therefore, by efficiently selecting which investment project to 
finance, promote capital accumulation and technology innovation which are fundamental for 
effective long-run growth. However, the opportunity to overcome the market failure situations 
depends on both the financial intermediation efficiency and the robustness of the regulatory 
framework aimed at protecting the lenders’ property rights. 
A financial regulatory framework and a court system in charge of law enforcement can be found in 
both common law and civil law countries. In order to protect the holders of right property, the 
efficiency and the “in time” functioning of the court system, by allowing contract enforcement, help 
enhancing the efficiency of financial intermediation and limiting the risk of credit rationing for 
well-performing firms without much collateral. Ultimately, a good functioning judicial system with 
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a low degree of uncertainty on enforcement increases firm competitiveness and total factor 
productivity. 
Historically, civil law countries have promoted the development of a bank oriented financial 
system, in which the particular type of financial intermediary has a crucial role in linking the 
economic agents in deficit (generally the firms) and the ones in surplus (generally the consumer 
households). In these countries, according to Schumpeter’s approach, credit is the driving force of 
the economic growth. 
On the contrary, in the countries where the regulatory system is based on the principles of common 
law, a market oriented financial system has been developed, where financial markets are the most 
important actors on the scene, by directly allowing the matching between the demand and the 
supply of financial funds. The banks always are engaged in the credit intermediation, but the equity 
and bond markets are the places where the most important amounts of funds is exchanged from 
surplus units to deficit ones. 
The level of financial intermediation of an economic system has been deeply analyzed by 
Goldsmith starting from the 1950s. In particular, with the Financial Interrelation Ratio (FIR), given 
by the ratio of the weight of the financial assets on the wealth of all sectors, Goldsmith devised a 
measure of the degree of financial intensity of an economic system.  The higher it is, the wider is 
financial deepening of the economic system. Another Goldsmith’s ratio analyzes the effective 
weight of the liabilities of the financial corporations on the ones of the other sectors: this ratio is the 
Financial Intermediation Ratio (FIN).    
The different models of financial framework will be analyzed in paragraph 2 according to the 
economic literature, considering also the law finance approach. In paragraph 3, considering the 
Goldsmith’s ratios and other indicators, a comparative analysis of the financial framework, of the 
debt and of the net financial wealth for the private non financial sector (in particular for the 
Households) among some European countries will be implemented using both EUROSTAT and 
OECD data for the period 2000-2008. 
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2.  The financial system models: bank oriented versus market oriented. 
 
The relationship between finance and growth has been traditionally analyzed considering a model in 
which development occurs in stages. An economy in an industrialization phase generally displays a 
financial system focused on the role of banks, which allow the matching between the units in 
surplus of financial resources (funding supply) and those in deficit (funding demand) and 
implement the maturity and risk transformations between the deposit instruments and the loans. In 
Italy and in Germany during the last part of the nineteenth century the universal banks have carried 
out a crucial role in the economic development process (Gershenkron, 1962) by financing the firms 
in the high innovation technology sectors: in this way they have promoted the long-run real growth. 
Banking intermediation presents the advantage of reducing the transaction costs involved in 
matching funding demand and supply, because of the economies of scale entailed in the process. 
A new perspective of analysis of the interrelation between finance and real growth in neoclassical 
terms, the so-called new view, has been developed by the study of Gurley and Shaw (1955), who, 
starting from the portfolio risk diversification theory, identify the crucial role of finance in the risk 
selection and allocation on behalf of the investors. The level of development of the economy 
determines the type of financial system: in the less developed countries banking intermediation is 
generally the unique channel for allocating the credit. The banks select the customers and hold a 
portfolio of borrowers diversified on the basis of profitability and riskiness, in order to maximize 
the return of the intermediation service. In more technologically advanced economic systems1, the 
financial sector is  more market oriented since it allows companies to directly access equity and 
bond markets in order to satisfy their financial requirements. Investors are able to use more 
sophisticated financial instruments that allow a more efficient and integrated management of the 
different types of risk. 
                                               
1
 The technology allows for reducing the transition costs at very low levels. 
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In the new view the resolution of the dichotomy between bank and market oriented system is 
considered as time sequence of the financial models depending on complexity and efficiency of the 
economic system.  
The asymmetric information approach points out that financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984), 
together with the promotion of the operation of the payment system, have a fundamental role in 
overcoming market failures (Levine, 1997, 2003). By monitoring and screening the firms’ projects 
during many years, banks are able to assess and prevent opportunistic behaviours related to adverse 
selection and to moral hazard problems. The final result is the improvement of the efficiency of the 
whole economic system, with a better allocation of saving flows and a more adequate evaluation of 
the risk profiles of the different investment decisions (Mayer, 1988). The efficient management of 
the banking system produces positive effects on the well-performing firms, which maximize profits 
and obtain sizable growth by undertaking investment projects characterized by a risk profile 
proportioned to their productive, management and economic-financial skills. Long-run economic 
growth is, therefore, promoted by an efficient banking system and the persistent relationship 
between banks and firms can avoid the failure of the fundamentally solid companies during 
recessions, thus warding off systemic effects (Mayer, 1988). 
The more recent literature on the endogenous growth introduces in the analytical models the 
financial variables2, which are crucial factors in explaining the technological shocks (Aghion and 
Howitt, (1992), Grossman and Helpman , (1991)), and allow the efficient accumulation of both real 
and human capital (Romer, (1986), (1990), Lucas, (1988), Aghion and Howitt, (1992), Grossman 
and Helpman , (1991)).    
According to the law finance approach, the relationship between finance and growth has to be 
analyzed taking into account the different legal traditions. The common law system, generally 
found in the Anglo-Saxon countries, has been historically oriented to a greater protection of the 
                                               
2
  See King and Levine, (1993), Bencivenga et al , (1996), Boot and Thakor, (1996),  Pagano, (1993), Amable and 
Chatelain, (2001). 
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holders of property rights towards the State, while the civil law one, stemmed in France, Italy and 
Germany, has been characterized by a lower degree of protection of the private sector. These two 
regulatory systems have shaped the evolution of the financial sector. In the Anglo-Saxon countries 
public companies and widespread shareholding have developed, while in continental Europe firm 
ownership is much more concentrated. The degree of property concentration points out two 
different kinds of governance conflicts: shareholder / manager in the common law systems, majority 
shareholder / minority shareholder in the civil law ones. In order to protect the holders of property 
rights towards the actions of managers, Anglo-Saxon countries have developed a framework of 
modern financial markets with small transaction costs and a court system which imposes hard 
penalties in situations of insider trading and finance stock manipulation. Very liquid financial 
markets are, in effects, the main protection for shareholders, who can sell on the market their shares 
in order to impede opportunistic behaviours by the managers: the exit option (Manzocchi and 
Padoan, 2004). The development of financial markets has also allowed operations like Manager 
Buy Out, MBO, and Leverage Buy Out, LBO, which are executed by managers in order to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour by the holders of rights property. Starting with Jensen (1986), the literature 
has shown that, in the cases where the low propensity of shareholders to select innovative projects 
has created difficulties for the more efficient managers, restrictions to the growth of the firms and to 
the efficient management of cash flows have been put in place. Some times well performing 
managers are able to react immediately by orienting the cash flows towards investment projects that 
allow to preserve the value of the firm , but these situations are not so common. 
The conflict between the different types of shareholders in the civil law systems has entailed a 
bigger cost for the firms to obtain funding directly on the financial market, because the minority 
shareholders demand a high risk premium on the invested capital in order to protect themselves 
from possible expropriation by the majority shareholders. According to the law-finance approach, 
banking credit is the most accessible funding instrument in the regulatory systems less oriented to 
the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. 
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In other words the common law and civil law systems have promoted respectively the development 
of market oriented and bank oriented financial models. In the system focused on banks, the latter 
have had a crucial role not only during the capital accumulation stages that anticipated a big 
industrialization jump3, but they also continue to be the main funding channel for those industrial 
sectors characterized by the presence of many small and medium firms, like in Italy with the PMI 
and in Germany with the mittelstand. 
 
 
3. Debt and net financial wealth: a comparative analysis for some European countries. 
 
The starting point of this study is to compare the degree of financial interrelation and intermediation 
of the some European countries using first of all the Goldsmith’s ratios- the Financial Interrelation 
Ratio, FIR, and the Financial Intermediation Ratio, FIN. The first one is defined as the ratio of the 
weight of the financial assets on the wealth of the whole economy (S1 according to ESA954 codes). 
Since it is very difficult to have a detailed and consistent estimate of the real wealth for each 
country considered, we provide an alternative version of the FIR employing as denominator the 
Gross Domestic Product at current prices. The FIN provides, instead, a direct measure of the degree 
of  financial intermediation based on the weight of the liabilities of the Financial Corporations (S12 
according to ESA95 codes) over the sum of the liabilities of all the other sectors: Non Financial 
Corporations (S11), General Government (S13), Households (S14), Rest of the World (S2). 
The data analysed are the Financial Accounts and the Gross Domestic Products at current prices of 
most of the countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU), the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. More precisely, the EMU countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (from now on we refer to the group 
                                               
3
 See Gershenkron (1962) who, describing the industrialization process in Germany and Italy during the last part of the 
nineteenth century, has focused on the role involved by universal bank in matching the funding requirements of the 
firms and the profitability expectations of the private investors, who had saved in the previous years. 
4
 European System of Accounts 1995, EUROSTAT, European Union, Council Regulation 2223/96.  
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formed by these ten countries plus Denmark ad EMU). The data sources are EUROSTAT and 
OECD database except for the United Kingdom, whose statistics are provided by UK Office for 
National Statistics. 
In the Figure 3.1 the distribution of the FIR ratio of some European countries (the most important 
four in Euro zone by GDP) is compared to the median FIR ratio of the European Monetary Union 
countries (basis 100). 
Figure 3.1: Financial Interrelation Ratio by European country 
FIR ratio (financial assets S1 / GDP)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
Focusing on the whole period 2000-2008, it seems that the United Kingdom is the economy with 
the highest degree of financial intensity: the FIR for UK is 145.4 % of the EMU median. 
Considering that the United Kingdom is historically a country with a market oriented financial 
system, the FIR ratio analysis seems to confirm this point of view. 
Italy, a country traditionally considered as a bank oriented financial system, presents, instead, 
during all the period analyzed 2000-2008, the lower level of financial interrelation, with a ratio 
equal to 20.3 % of the EMU median. 
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For the United Kingdom the FIN (see Figure 3.2), that measures the degree of the financial 
intermediation in an economic system, presents an increasing weight of intermediation from 2000 
up to 2008. Spain, France and Italy are countries with a lower degree of intermediation compared to 
the UK and to Germany. 
 Figure 3.2: Financial Intermediation Ratio by European country 
FIN ratio (liabilities S12 / liabilities S11+S13+S14+S2)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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  Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
We also present a measure of the degree of banking intermediation on the whole financial 
intermediation in an economic system by considering the Credit Intermediation Ratio defined as the 
weight of the loans granted by the Financial Corporations on the liabilities issued by all the other 
sectors (see Capelle-Blancard et al., 2006). 
Germany seems to be the  most important economic system in terms of banking intermediation with 
a CIR equal to 117.4 % of the EMU median (basis 100) during the years analyzed, even though it 
presents a decreasing path over the period. The situation of Germany confirms its bank oriented 
financial model traditionally related to the universal bank, even though from 2006 it has hardly 
reduced the weight of the loans compared to the whole financial intermediation. Spain presents, 
instead, an increasing path of the CIR up to 2008 with a percentage of 130.0 of the EMU median. 
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Figure 3.3: Credit Intermediation Ratio by European country 
CIR ratio (loans S12 / liabilities S11+S13+S14+S2)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
We use another measure of the financial deepening: the NFIR, Net Financial Interrelation Ratio, 
calculated by dividing the net financial wealth (defined as total financial assets minus total financial 
liabilities) by the Gross Domestic Product at current prices for each country.  
In this study we analyze the NFIR for the private non financial sector, defined as the sum of Non 
financial Corporations and Households. 
In Figure 3.4 we show a distribution of the NFIR for some European countries. Italy displays the 
best performance in terms of the net financial wealth on the GDP, about three times the median of 
EMU countries, but in 2008 there is a great decrease in comparison with the previous two years. 
The financial repression in 2008 is a common situation for the other countries too. Instead, in Spain 
the net financial wealth has been decreasing since 2003. 
During all the period considered, the UK and Germany have values of the NFIR above the EMU 
median, while on average France is steadily close to it. 
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Figure 3.4: Net Financial Interrelation Ratio by European country 
NFIR  for the Private Non Financial Sector (net financial wealth S11+S14 / GDP)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
We also analyze (Figure 3.5) for the same European countries the weight on GDP of the financial 
liabilities of the whole non financial sector, defined as the sum of Non financial Corporations, 
Households and General Government. The UK is the country that presents the highest level of 
financial liabilities in the whole non financial sector over the GDP, on average 124.00 % of the 
EMU median during the years 2000-2008. At the other extreme, the Italian ratio is equal to 91.7 % 
of the reference median, the lowest among the considered European countries.  
However the different level of the financial liabilities also depends on the financial deepening for 
each country and on the traditional morphology of its financial system. It is relevant to notice that 
the countries where the FIR and the FIN present the highest values (which are those historically 
characterized by market oriented financial systems), the debt of the private non financial sector 
(S11+S14) is higher than the others (see figure 3.6). On average during all the years considered, 
Italy and Germany, traditionally bank oriented financial systems, have a ratio of financial liabilities 
on the GDP for the private non financial sector respectively equal to 91.4 % and 69.3 %, while the 
UK presents a level of 134.1 %. 
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Figure 3.5 : Financial liabilities on GDP of the whole non financial sector (S11+S13+S14) 
by European country  
Financial liabilities on GDP of the whole non fiancial sector (S11+S13+S14)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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    Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
Figure 3.6 : Financial liabilities on GDP of the private non financial sector (S11+ S14) 
by European country  
Financial liabilities on GDP of the private non fiancial sector (S11+S14)
(Median EMU basis 100)
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
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At the end we analyze the financial framework of Households for the same European countries. 
More precisely we calculate for this sector by each considered country the Net Financial 
Interrelation Ratio (see Figure 3.7) and the weight of financial liabilities on the financial assets (see 
Figure 3.8) from 2000 up to 2008. 
The highest values of the NFIR for the Household sector during all the considered period are found 
in Italy and the UK, respectively 167.6 % and 159.6 % on the EMU median (basis 100), while the 
level for Spain is equal to 83.1 %.       
 
Figure 3.7 : Net Financial Interrelation Ratio for the  Households sector 
by European country 
NFIR for the Households (net financial wealth S14 / GDP)
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database. 
 
The Spanish Households are the most indebted with a percentage of 42.4 of the financial liabilities 
on the financial assets. At the other extreme, the Italian ones present the lowest leverage ratio, 
16.1%, compared to the EMU median of 37.4%. 
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Figure 3.8 : Financial liabilities on financial assets  for the Households sector 
by European country 
Financial liabilities on financial assests for Households sector
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Source: Our elaboration on EUROSTAT database, OECD database, UK ONS database.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the Goldsmith’s ratios and of the debt of the private non financial sector calculated 
by using the financial accounts of some European countries brings up useful elements in order to 
asses the financial framework of these systems as regard the European Monetary Union one. The 
countries historically oriented to a market financial model seem to point out a financial interrelation 
higher than the bank oriented ones. The UK in fact presents the highest values for the FIR and FIN 
among the countries analyzed. On the contrary Germany, traditionally characterized by a bank 
oriented financial system, presents the greatest degree of credit intermediation as regard the 
European Monetary Union median. Assessing the net financial wealth on the GDP of the private 
non financial sector, Italy appears to be the financial system with the best performance and, further, 
it is the country where the Household sector has the minor level of the debt on the GDP. 
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The analysis conducted by calculating the ratios on the financial accounts seems to confirm a 
different framework between the market and bank oriented financial systems. In particular the last 
ones, with a major intensity of the financial interrelation, may be more sensible to the sudden 
financial turmoils, in particular when the risk profile of each financial transaction and of each 
counterpart has not been evaluated in the right way by the financial intermediaries. A correct 
assessment of the risks could be more consistent in a long-run relationship between the borrower 
and the bank, where the last ones operate as “delegated monitors” (Diamond, 1984). 
Leaving out the aspects of the pro-cyclic impacts on the financial system of the regulatory 
framework of Basel II rules5 and of the implementation of International Standard Accounts 
principles6, the market oriented financial systems and the ones where the growth of financial sector 
has been speeded in few years, see Spain in two last decades, seem to point out a mayor degree of 
vulnerability to a sudden financial crisis for the private non financial sector (and in particular for the 
Households one).  
   
                                               
5
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2010), May. 
6
 The pro-cyclic impact of IAS is related to the evaluation at the fair value (or market value) of the financial 
instruments. 
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